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MEAN  REVERSION  IN  EQUILIBRIUM  ASSET  PRICES 
ABSTRACT 
Recent  empirical  studies have found  that stock  returns contain 
substantial  negative  serial  correlation  at long  horizons.  We examine  this 
finding with a series of  Monte Carlo  simulations  in  order  to demonstrate 
that it is  consistent  with  an  equilibrium  model of asset pricing.  When 
investors  display  only a moderate  degree  of risk  aversion,  commonly  used 
measures  of mean reversion  in stock prices  calculated  from actual  returns 
data nearly  always  lie within  a 60 percent confidence  interval of the median 
of the Monte  Carlo distributions.  From  this evidence,  we conclude  that the 
degree  of serial  correlation  in the data  could  plausibly  have  been  generated 
by our model. 
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Recent  research  into the behavior of the stock market  reports evidence 
that returns  are negatively  serially correlated.  Poterba  and Summers  (1987) 
find  that variance  ratio  tests reject  the hypothesis  that stock prices 
follow  a random  walk,  and Fama  and French  (1988) show that there is 
significant  autocorrelation  in long—horizon  returns.1  It is well known 
[see Leroy (1973), Lucas  (1978), and Mlchener  (1982)1  that serial 
correlation  of returns does  not in itself imply a violation  of market 
efficiency.2  Nevertheless,  there is a tendency  to conclude  that evidence  of 
mean reversion  in stock prices  constitutes a rejection  of equilibrium models 
of rational  asset  pricing.  Fama and French  suggest  this interpretation  as a 
logical possibility,  while Poterba and Summers argue  that  the serial 
correlation  in returns should  be attributed  to "price  fads".  In this paper 
we demonstrate  that the empirically  estimated  serial  correlation  of stock 
returns  is consistent  with an equilibrium  model  of  asset  pricing. 
The method  and organization  of the paper  is as follows.  The next 
section  discusses  the equilibrium  asset  pricing model  that we  study.  We 
1.  Poterba  and Summers  find negative  serial correlation  for stock  returns 
over long horizons  using monthly  and annual  data.  Interestingly,  Lo and 
MacKinlay  (forthcoming)  find that stock  returns are positively  correlated, 
using  weekly  observations. 
2.  Grossman  and Shiller  (1981) make this same point in  showing  that the 
"excess"  volatility  implied by variance  bounds  tests can be partly  explained 
by risk  aversion  in a consumption beta  model.  More recently,  Black  (1988) 
has discussed  the relation between  mean reversion  and consumption  smoothing. —2— 
begin  with  Lucas'  (1978) model  of an  exchange economy and adopt  parametric 
representations  for preferences  and the stochastic  process governing  the 
exogenous  forcing variable  (i.e.,  the endowment  stream) which admit  a closed 
form  solution  to the asset pricing  problem.  The period  utility  function we 
work with is the constant relative  risk aversion  function.  For preferences 
of this sort,  the coefficient of relative risk  mversion  is also  the inverse 
of the elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution in  consumption  so that it  is 
difficult  to seperate  agents'  tolerance  for risk from their desire  to have 
smooth  consumption.  However,  in a setting where agents  confront  an 
intertemporal  consumption/investment  problem It makes more  sense to 
interpret  the concavity  of the utility function in terms of the consumption 
smoothing  motive, and that is the interpretation  we  make.  The exogenous 
forcing  variable  is assumed  to obey  Hamilton's  (1988) Markov  trend in 
logarithms  model.  This  model  conveniently  incorporates  important  business 
cycle  properties  which  are characteristic  of many  economic  time series.  In 
particular,  Hamilton's  representation  is able to capture stochastic 
switching  between  positive and negative growth  regimes of the time series 
and its asymmetric  growth  over the course of the cycle  [Neftci  (1984)1. 
Next,  the parameters  of the Markov  trend in  logarithms  nodel are 
estimated  by maximum  likelihood  using  annual observations  on the U.S. 
economy.  This  is done so that we  can calibrate  the asset  pricing model  by 
setting  the parameters  of the exogenous  forcing process  equal  to these 
maximum  likelihood  estimates.  Unfortunately,  the theory provides  little 
guidance  regarding  the appropriate  time series on  which  to calibrate  the 
model  because  in the Lucas  model,  equilibrium  consumption  equals  output 
which  also  equals  dividends.  Empirically,  none  of these  tine series  appear 
to be more  appropriate  than the others ! priori,  so we calibrate  the model —3— 
seperately  to each  of the three series.  It turns out that our results are 
robust  to variations  in the time series on  which we calibrate  the model. 
The maximum  likelihood  estimates  of the Markov  trend  in logarithms  model  for 
dividends,  consumption,  and GNP are reported in  section  3. 
In section 4, we study  the measures of mean reversion  which have 
appeared  in the literature.  These are the variance  ratio  statistics  used by 
Poterba  and Summers and  the regression  coefficients  calculated  by Fama  and 
French.3  First, we  caluclate  these statistics  from  historical  data  on the 
Standard  and Poors  500 returns.  Next,  a Monte  Carlo  distribution  of these 
statistics  is generated  under  the assumption  that our equilibrium  model  of 
asset  pricing  is true.  Inferences  regarding  the equilibrium  model are then 
drawn  using  classical  hypothesis  testing procedures  and  the Monte Carlo 
distribution  as the null.  We are principally  interested  in two hypotheses. 
The first is the random walk  model  of stock prices, which is an implication 
of the Lucas model  when  agents  have  linear utility.  The second hypothesis 
is that observed  asset  prices  are determined  in equilibrium  but agents 
attempt  to smooth  their consumption.  In this setting,  asset  returns can be 
negatively  serially  correlated  even though  they rationally  reflect market 
fundamentals. 
To summarize  our results,  we  find, for all return horizons  longer 
than one year,  that  the variance  ratio statistics  and regression 
coefficients  calculated  from  the actual  Standard  and Poors returns lie near 
3. We  might  also  have examined variance  bounds  tests.  But as Campbell  and 
Shiller  (1988)  point  out,  there is an  equivalence  between variance  ratio 
tests of the type in Poterba and Summers and variance  bounds  tests pioneered 
by Shiller  (1981). —4— 
the 60  percent  confidence  band  of the median  of the Monte  Carlo  distribution 
generated  under the linear  utility (random walk)  model.  When investors 
display only a moderate desire  to smooth  their consumption,  these same 
statistics  calculated  from the data  lie at or near the median  of the Monte 
Carlo distribution.  When  we test the null hypothesis  against a diffuse 
alternative,  we cannot  reject  the random walk  model at the standard  5 
percent  significance  level.  However,  the marginal  significance  levels of 
the  test are much smaller when the null distribution  is  generated  assuming 
the utility  function is concave.  We  conclude  that much  of the serial 
correlation  in actual  stock  returns can be attributed  to small  sample  bias 
but a full explanation  requires  concavity of the utility  function. 
2.  The Equi1ibriu Model. 
2.1 A Case of  the Lucas Model. 
Consider  the economy  studied by Lucas  (1978)  in which  there are a 
large  number of infinitely  lived and identical agents  and a fixed  number of 
assets  which  exogenously  produce units of the same  nonstoreable  consumption 
good.  Let  there be K agents  and N productive  units.  Each  assec has a 
single  perfectly  divisible  claim outstanding  on  it, and these claims  are 
traded  in a competitive  equity  market.  The first—order  necessary  conditions 
for a typical agent's  optimization  problem are, 
Pj,U'(Ct)  tU'(C+i)[P,t+i+ D+i]  j=1,2,...,M  (1) 
where  = The  real price of  asset j  in terms of the consumption  good. —5— 
U'(C)  — Marginal  utility of consumption,  C,  for a typical 
consumer/investor. 
8  = A  subjective  discount  factor,  0 < 0 < 1. 
= The  payoff or  dividend  from the jth productive  unit. 
Et 
= The  mathematical  expectation  conditioned  on information 
available  at time  t. 
In  equilibrium,  per capita ownership  of asset j  is 1/K.  It follows 
that equilibrium  per capita  consumption,  C,  is  the per capita  claim  to the 
total endowment  in that period,  (l/K)ZN1D. 
Now, make this substitution  in 
equation  (1) and sum over  j  to obtain  an  equilibrium  condition  involwing 
economy wide  or market  prices  and quantities  on a per capita  basis.  That 
P  U'(D) 
= 0 EU' (D i)(Pt  i 
+ DtiJ,  (2) 
where P  (1,'K)E  is the share of the market's  value owned  by a typical 
agent  and Dt 
• (l/K)L  Since each  productive  unit has only  a single 
share  outstanding,  and the number  of  productive  units are fixed,  these are 
the theoretical  value weighted  market  indices adjusted  for population. 
Let preferences  be given  by  constant  relative  risk  aversion utility: 
TJ(C) = —6— 
where  —o < y < 0 is the coefficient of relative  risk aversion.  Now (2) 
simplifies  to a stochastic  difference  equation which  is linear in PD.  That 
is, 
PD 
=  6 EP  1D1  +  (3) 
Iterating  (3) forward,  the current market  value, P' 
can be expressed  as a 
nonlinear  function of current and expected future  payoffs, 
P  D E  E  (4) 
k=1 
To obtain a closed  form solution,  we must specify  the stochastic  process 
governing  CDt) and this is done in the next subsection.  We will refer  to 
the exogenous  forcing  variable  as dividends  in the next two subsections.  We 
do this because it helps  to  clarify  the exposition,  not because we restrict 
our attention  to dividends  when  assessing  the performance of the model.  In 
fact, we consider  alternative  processes  as  well. 
2.2  A  Nonlinear  Stochastic Model for the Exogenous Forcing  Process. 
Hamilton (1987)  has suggested  modeling  the trends in  nonstationary 
time series  as Markov  processes,  and has applied  this approach  to the study 
of post—World  War II real GNP.  One of the attractive  features of this 
approach  is its ability  to account  for the asymmetric  behavior  that many 
macroeconomic  time series  display over the business cycle.  Hamilton  reports —7— 
estimates  of the U.S.  economy's growth  state which  coincide  closely with 
NBER  dating  of postwar recessions,  and Lam (1988) shows  that the model 
forecasts  real GNP better at  short  horizons  than either  the random  walk 
model  or  autoregressions  of low order.  Since  the observations  we use are 
cyclical and display asymmetries  characteristic  of economic  time series  over 
the cycle,  they are natural  candidates  for this specification.  Let dt 
denote  the logarithm  of the exogenous  forcing variable  The Karkov  trend 
in  logarithms  model  can be  written  as, 
d  di  +  +  + u, s1 
'  (5) 
where  is a sequence  of independent and identically  distributed  normal 
variates  with zero mean and variance  e2,  and  (s}  is a sequence  of Markov 
random  variables which take on values  of 0 or 1  with transition 
probabilities, 
Pr[s_ lIs_1 11 
Pr[s  OIs_1 1]  l—p,  (6) 
Pr[s OIsi 
and  Pr[st_ lI5t_ 01  l—q. 
The exogenous  forcing process  thus follows a random  walk in logarithms 
(d=di+ t) with  stochastic  drift  + o  At this point, we make 
a normalization  by  requiring >  0 and  < 0.  We are said  to be in a high —8— 
growth  (boom)  state  when sO, and in a low growth  (depression) State when 
sl.  The probability  of a boom next period given that the economy  currently 
enjoys a boom is q, while  the probability  of a depression  next period given 
a current  depression  state  is p.  The probabilities  of transition  from  boom 
to depression  and depression  to boom are  then l—q and i—p respectively.  The 
exogenous  forcing variable  grows at the rate  during a boom,  and  + 
during a depression.  The process  {s} 
can be represented  as a first—order 
autoregression  with an  autocorrelation  coefficient  of (p+q—l) which  can be 
interpreted  as a measure  of persistence in the forcing process. 
It is also  useful  to think of the process loosely within  the 
following  context.  The theory relates dividends  to asset prices.  In actual 
economies,  future nominal  dividend payments are announced  in  advance  so a 
good deal of next period's dividend growth  is currently  known.  This is 
captured by the timing  of the state in the Markov  trend and in the next 
subsection,  agents in the artificial  economy will be  assumed  to observe  the 
current state of the economy.  From (5),  the forecastable  part of  dividend 
growth  during  period  t—l is  +  5_'  which  is revealed  at t—l.  The 
unforecastable  part of real  dividend growth,  c, might  be  thougbt of as a 
combination  of  unanticipated  inflation and productivity  shocks. 
We note at this point  that it is the data,  and not  the discretion  of 
the Investigator  which  will choose  the regime.  That is,  when  we calculate 
the Monte  Carlo distributions  implied by the model,  the parameters 
of the forcing process will be  set equal  to maximum  likelihood 
estimates  obtained  from the data. —9-- 
2.3  Equi1ibriu Asset Prices. 
Assuming  that the process driving  the exogenous  forcing variable  is 
given  by (5) and (6), we show in the appendix  that the solution  to (4) is, 
= 
Dt,  (7) 
B g(s) [1 — B  I 
where 
P(st) 
=  -  -  —  - 
1  — B(p 
+ q]  + B (p + q  — 1) 
8 • B  exp[u0(l÷-r) + (1+y)2a2/2J, 
• exp((1+y)1, 
1  0 
g(s) 
= 1 
(p + q — 1)  = 0 
f(s) 
= 
p+q—l  s=l 
A number  of interesting  features of the equilibrium  price  function 
emerge.  First,  asset  prices  are proportional  to the forcing variable.4 
4. In the simple  model  studied here this implies that  the price dividend 
ratio  takes  on one of two values,  p(O) or p(l).  This  is a consequence  of 
assuming  that agents  observe  s. 
In the more realistic  case in which s  is 
unobserved  and must be estimated,  the price dividend  ratio would  be a 
continuous  variable  fluctuating  between the two bounds  of p(O) and  p(l). -10-- 
Second,  the factor  of proportionality  depends  on investors'  the inverse of 
the elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  and whether  the economy  is 
currently  in the high-growth  state or low  growth  state according  to, 
>  < 
p(O)  =  p(l)  as  y  =  —1. 
<  > 
The  interpretation  of this is straightforward.  For a giwen  level  of 
current  dividends,  suppose  that the economy is known  to be in a high  growth 
state  (s=O).  By (6), this implies that the economy  is likely  to remain  in 
a high  growth  state  into the future, and hence  anticipated  future dividends 
are high.  This  has two effects on  asset  prices  that work  in  opposite 
directions.  First,  there is what we  refer  to as a wealth  effect in  which 
higher  expected  future  dividends  cause agents  to want  to increase  their 
asset  holdings.  The increased  asset demand  arising  from the wealth  effect 
works  to raise current  asset prices.  Working  in the opposite direction  is a 
substitution  effect  arising  from agents' attempts  to smooth  their 
consumption  paths.  When  expected  future dividends  are high,  the consumption 
smoothing  motive  leads  agents  to want to  increase  current consumption  in 
anticipation  of higher  future  investment  income.  To finance higher  current 
consumption,  agents  attempt  to  sell off part  of their asset  holdings,  which, 
in  equilibrium  results  in  falling asset prices.  Log utility  (-y =  —1)  is a 
borderline  case in  which  the wealth  effect  and the substitution  effect 
exactly  cancel  out.  This can be seen, perhaps, more clearly  from (4) in 
which the solution  for y =  —l  is  Pt 
= (8,'[l—ØJ) Dt. 
In this case,  the 
factor  of proportionality  relating  prices  to dividends  is a constant.  When —11— 
the concavity  of the utility  function is less  than it is in the log case, 
the wealth  effect assumes greater  importance, so that p(O) >  p(l).  In the 
limiting  case of linear  utility  (yO),  the wealth  effect  is all that 
matters,  since agents  have  no desire  to smooth  consumption.  Conversely, 
when the utility  function  is more concave than is implied by log utility, 
the intertemporal  substitution  effect  dominates  the wealth  effect  causing 
p(l) >  p(O). 
From  (5) and (7), equilibrium  gross  returns are computed  as, 
R 
= (P+ D)/Pt 1 
= ([P(5)441/P(st_i)}exp(0 
+  5i+  (8) 
Notice that because  the gross  return  depends on  it is a continuous  random 
variable  on [O,), and not a two point  process. 
3.  1axi.u Likelihood  Estimates  of the flarkov Trend in Logarith.s  Process. 
This section presents  estimation  results for the Markov  trend  in 
logarithms  model  of the exogenous  forcing variable.  The Markov  trend model 
is nonlinear  in the sense  that current values  of the forcing variable  cannot 
be  expressed  as a linear  function of  past values.  Even though  the state,  s, 
is unobservable  to the econometrician,  given  the normality  assumption  on the 
t's,  the parameters  of the process,  (p,q,a,a1,a) 
can be  estimated  by 
maximum  likelihood.  The Interested  reader is directed  to Hamilton  (1987) 
for details on estimation  or Lam (1988) who generalizes  the Hasilton  niodel. 
When we proceed to generate  the Monte Carlo distributions  from which we draw 
statistical  inference  regarding  the model,  the parameters  of the model will —12— 
be  set to the maximum  likelihood  estimates  to match  the process driving  our 
model to U.S. historical  data. 
The theory offers  little guidance  regarding  the appropriate 
empirical  counterpart  to the exogenous  forcing variable.  That is because 
equilibrium  consumption  of  section 2.1 equals  output  which  also equals 
dividends.  Consequently,  we consider  three time series,  all in per capita 
terms5:  real  dividends,  real consumption,  and real GNP. 
The dividend  data  are annual observations  from  the Standatd  and 
Poors  500 index  deflated  by the CPI from  1871  to 1985.6  We use these data 
as a benchmark  because  they represent  the longest available  time series, and 
we believe  that the characteristics  of these data  are representative  of 
equity  returns  and dividend disbursements  in  general.  Also,  the Standard 
and Poors  500 index is  one of the data  sets  used by  Poterba and Summers,  so 
a direct  comparison  can be made  with some of their results.  We follow  both 
Poterba  and Summers  and Fama  and French  in deflating  returns  by the CPI.7 
5.  In an earlier  version of this paper,  the adjustment  for population 
growth  was not made.  There  is virtually  no difference  between  the results 
with and without  this  adjustment. 
6. This is the Standard and Poors historical  data used by  Summers  and 
Poterba.  Observations  on returns and the CPI from 1871 to 1926  are from 
Wilson  and  Jones (1987), and from  Ibbotson and Sinquefield  (1982) from 1926 
to 1985.  Observations  on  nominal  dividends  are those used by Campbell  and 
Shiller  (1987). 
7. The choice  of deflator  is not innocuous.  As both Poterba and  Summers 
and Fama and French  state,  there  is little difference  between using  nominal 
returns and real returns deflated  by the CPI.  However,  we found little 
evidence  of mean reversion  in the Standard and Poors data  when returns were 
(Footnote  continues  on next page) —13— 
The consumption  data  are constructed  by  splicing  the Kendrick  consumption 
series,  published  in Balke and Gordon  (1986), from  1889  to 1928 to the 
National  Income  and Product Accounts  data from 1929 to 1985.  The real  GNP 
data is constructed  by combining  observations  from  1869 to 1908 from Romer 
(1989) with data from 1909 to 1928 from Rouser  (1985), and observations  from 
1929  to  1985 from the National  Income  and Product Accounts.  per capita 
observations  on each  of these  time—series  are then obtained by dividing  them 
by annual  population  estimates  from the Historical  Statistics  of the United 
States  and the Economic Report  of the President. 
The estimation  results and some  summary statistics  are reported  in 
Table  1.  For the most part, the parameters  are accurately  estimated.  When 
the economy  is in a boom this year,  the estimated  probability  that it 
continues  in a boom next year is q.  As can be seen,  this is  .95 for 
dividends,  .98 for GNP and .98 for consumption.  The estimated  rate  of 
growth  during  a boom,  is .013, .016, and  .015 for dividends, 
GNP,  and consumption,  respectively.  When in a boom,  the estimated 
probability  of a transition  to a negative growth  state next  period,  1—q, is 
.05 for dividends,  and .02 for GNP and consumption.  This implies that we 
might  expect  to observe  a crash once every  20 years  or so for dividends,  and 
every  50 years  for consumption and GNP.  While  in a depression  state, 
(Footnote  continued  from  previous  page) 
deflated  by the FF1.  This is not surprising  given  the difference  between 
the two measures  of inflation.  It is well  known  that the CPI tends  to be 
very persistent,  while the PPI, which  behaves more like  an  asset price, 
tends  to be very  noisy. —14— 
expected  growth,  + ,  is  -.36 for dividends,  —.16 for GNP and —.08 for 
consumption.  At first glance,  the expected rate  of decline  in  dividends 
seems  quite  large.  Sut, negative  growth rates  of this  magnitude  have 
actually  occured with some degree  of regularity.  In  fact,  real dividends 
fell by more than 36 percent during  4 of the 116 years  of our sample.8 
Once the economy  finds itself  in a depression,  the probability  that 
it will be in a depression  the following year,  p,  is estimated  to be .1748 
for dividends,  .5096  for GNP and .5279 for consumption.  We note that the 
likelihood  function is flat for variations  in p in estimation  of the process 
using the dividend  data.  This is not surprising  given the asymmetric 
behavior of dividends  over  the business cycle.  That is,  downturns  have 
generally  been  short  lived,  lasting between 4 and 6 quarters.  This makes  it 
difficult  to obtain  a good  estimate  of  p using annual  observations.9 
We nov turn to the study  of  equilibrium  asset  prices  implied  by this 
nonstationary  dividend  process. 
4. The Serial Correlation of  Equilibrium and Actual Returns. 
In  this section,  returns obtained  from the equilibrium  model  of 
Section  2 are used to generate  Monte Carlo  distributions  of the variance 
8. There were 9 years  in  the sample  in which dividends  fell between  10  and 
20 percent, and 4 years  in which  they  fell between  20  and 30  percent. 
9.  These  estimates  also  appear  reasonable  in that they  produce artificial 
sample  paths  (generated  as described  in the next section)  that look 
remarkably  like the actual  time series. —15— 
ratio  statistic  used by  Poterba and Summers, and the regression  coefficients 
calculated  by Fama  and French.  These  distributions  are generated  both for 
the case  of linear utility  and for a case in which  the utility  function  is 
concave.  They are then  used  to draw  inference  about  the equilibrium  model 
and  the model  driving  the exogenous  forcing variable.  For each  assumption 
about  the degree  of investor risk  aversion,  the model is calibrated  to the 
estimated  dividend,  consumption,  and GNP processes  reported  in table 1. 
That is,  the parameters  of the forcing process,  are set to 
the values in the columns  of table  1  and each case is considered  in turn. 
The subjective  discount  factor  is assumed  to be 0.98 throughout.  The 
procedure  is as follows:  First, given  p and q, we generate  a sequence of 
116  's  according  to (6).  Second, given  a,  we 116 independent  draws  from 
a normal  distribution  with zero mean and variance  a2 are taken  to form a 
sequence  of  Third,  given  ,ai,B,y,(s), 
and  {c}, we generate  a 
sample  of 116 returns according  to equation  (7).  For each  sample of returns 
the variance  ratio  and regression  coefficient are calculated  for horizons  1 
through  10. This experiment  is repeated  10,000  times.  The tabulation of 
these calculations  is the Monte Carlo distribution  of the statistic  from 
which  we draw  inference.  The sample  size of 116 is chosen to  correspond  to 
the 116 annual  observations  available  in the actual  Standard and Poors 
returns.  To facilitate  the exposition,  we report  the results  in figures.1° 
We calculate  the median  and 60 percent confidence  intervals  about  the median 
10.  An appendix  presenting  the results in tabular form  is  available  upon 
request. —16— 
of the distribution  for the statistic  under  investigation.  A median  is also 
calculated  from  1,000  time series samples of 1160 returns each  to get an 
idea  of the "true" or large sample  value of the variance  ratio  or regression 
coefficient  statistics.  We  refer  to this as the "large" sample  median.  In 
the case of linear  utility,  the true values  are known, and this calculation 
gives  us a loose idea  of the rate  of  convergence  of these statistics  to 
their  true values.  When the utility  function is concave, analytic 
calculation  of the true values is  difficult  and we take  this calculation  to 
be the true  large sample  values.  Each figure displays  the large  and small 
sample  medians,  the 60 percent confidence  intervals  about  the small  sample 
median  and the point  estimates  calculated  from  actual  Standard  and Poors 
returns. 
Given the Monte Carlo  distributions  of the variance  ratio statistic 
and the autocorrelation  coefficient  on  returns, we can determine  the 
likelihood  that the estimates  obtained from  actual  data  were  drawn  from the 
Monte  Carlo distribution  implied by  equilibrium  returns. 
4.1  Variance  Ratios. 
Let  be  the one period  real rate of  return, and R 
be the simple 
k—period  return.  That is,  Rk  =  R  ..  The  variance  ratio  for returns 
t  j0  t-j 
at the kth horizon  is defined as, 
Var(R) 
VR(k)  k Var(R) 
(12) —17— 
It is easy to show that the the variance ratio  can be  expressed  in terms of 
the return's autocorrelations.  That is, 
2 
k-i 
VR(k)  = 1 +  E  (k-j) p.,  (13) 
j=i  3 
where 
Pj 
is the jth autocorrelation  on returns.  When returns are serially 
uncorrelated,  the variance  ratio  is equal  to one for all k in large 
samples)1  This is usually  taken as the null  hypothesis  in tests of "market 
efficiency,"  corresponds  to the case  where stock  prices follow  a random 
walk,  and is true in the equilibrium  model of Section 2 only  when investors 
have linear  utility.  Stock  prices are said to be "mean reverting"  If 
returns are negatively  correlated  and evidence of mean reversion  is inferred 
from variance  ratios  which  lie below  unity.  This is the finding of Poterba 
and Summers. 
We consider  first  the case of  linear  utility.  Figures  1—3 display 
the results under  linear  utility  for models calibrated  to the dividend, 
GNP,  and consumption  processes  respectively.  Since  these returns  are 
uncorrelated  by construction,  all of the deviation  of the median  of the 
variance  ratio's distribution  from  unity  is due to small  sample  bias.  The 
serial  correlation  of returns,  and hence  their predictability  is only 
apparent.  This result  can be viewed  in  the same light as the business  cycle 
11. In  small  samples,  as  Poterba  and Summers point out,  the sample 
autocorrelations  of  returns  are biased  so  E[VR(k)J  1 even when  returns  are 
independent. —18— 
in which recessions  occur with random periodicity.  Although  real GNP may 
appear  to be mean  reverting,  this does not  imply that business  cycle  turning 
points are predictable.  In the equilibrium  model  of  asset  prices,  the 
exogenous  forcing variable  has a business  cycle interpretation.  Since 
equilibrium  asset prices  are proportional  to the forcing variable,  and its 
stochastic  process  implies that a boom is usually  followed by a boom,  the 
appearance  of mean reversion  in asset prices  is produced,  but  this does 
not mean that returns are predictable.  In the large sample  (T=l160),  most 
of the bias has dissappeared.  In Figure  1,  it is seen that the variance 
ratios calculated  from the Standard and Poors data fall within  the 60 
percent  confidence  interval of the Monte Carlo  distribution  except at the 7, 
8, and 9 year  horizons  when the model is  calibrated  to the dividend 
process.12 However,  these outliers are still within  the traditional 95 
percent  confidence  interval.  The evidence  is more favorable  to the model 
when the forcing process  is matched  to consumption  and GNP.  Figures 2 and 3 
display  variance  ratios  calculated  from the actual  data which lie uniformly 
within  the 60 percent confidence  interval of the median  of the Monte Carlo 
distribution. 
When  agents'  utility  function is concave,  the results re  even more 
favorable  to the model.  Figure 4 reports  the results of the above 
calculations  assuming  concave  utility with y = —1.4 and  the forcing process 
matched  to the dividends.  Now the median  of both the small  and large sample 
12. These estimates  of the variance  ratios are smaller  than  those reported 
by Poterba  and Summers because  they make  a bias correction  assuming  a null 
hypothesis  of a homoskedastic  random  walk  for asset  prices.  The bias 
correction  is irrelevant  for our purposes. —19— 
distributions  of the variance  ratio statistics  are well  below  1.0 at every 
horizon.  The median  of the small sample  (T=116) distribution  is actually 
below  the variance  ratios  calculated  from the annual  returns  on the S & P 
500, which  implies  that the equilibrium  model with y = -1.4  generates  more 
negative  serial  correlation  in returns  than is found  in the actual  data.13 
We find  that the general  pattern of the variance  ratios  calculated  from the 
data is replicated  rather well by the large sample  median of the Monte  Carlo 
distribution  at all but  the first horizon.  The discrepancy  at the first 
horizon occurs  because  there  is almost no first order  serial correlation  in 
the annual  returns data, while the equilibrium  model  produces  some  negative 
first  order serial  correlation. 
Figures 5 and 6 display  the results when the forcing process  is 
calibrated  to the GNP process where the coefficient of relative  risk 
aversion  is —1.6, and  the consumption  process where  the coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion  is —1.7 respectively.  Here,  the variance  ratios 
calculated  from the S & P returns  lie close  to the median  of the 
distribution,  and are uniformly  within  the 60  percent confidence  interval 
about  the median)4 We conclude  that the model  cannot be rejected  at less 
than the 60  percent  level whether  the consumption  smoothing  motive  is 
present  or not. 
13. When y—2, the  model  yields  much more mean reversion  than is  in the 
data.  The entire  60% confidence  band lies below  the sample  values. 
14. The above  calculations  were also  performed  for y = —4.0.  As investors 
become  more  risk  averse,  the negative  serial  correlation  in returns 
increases  at a decreasing  rate, and so the median  of the Monte  Carlo 
distribution  of the variance  ratio statistics  moves  further below  1.0. —20— 
4.2  Regression  Coefficients  on  Returns  of Varying  Horizons. 
Consider  estimating  the first—order serial  correlation  coefficient 
on i—period  returns b  running  the following  regression: 
= a 
+ bRt_,t 
+  '  =  l,2,...,lO  (14) 
where  is the continuously  compounded  real  stock  return  from t to  t+t. 
It is easy to show that the relation between  the autocorrelations  of one— 
period  returns and the autocorrelation  of the i—period  return  is, 
b 
+ 2p2 
+  .  +  + (t_l)Pi+ 
.  + 2t—2 
+ 2r—l  =  +  2(t—l)p1 
+ 2(t—2)p2  +  .  + 
Using monthly  returns on the CRSP index, Fama  and French  find that the slope 
coefficient b  is negative  for t greater than  one year.  From this they 
infer  that stock  prices are mean reverting.  Ve examine  their result by 
computing  the empirical  distribution  of these  regression  coefficients 
implied  by the model in  Section 2. 
We begin with the linear  utility  (y=O) case.  Figures 7-9 display 
for the model  calibrated  to dividends,  GNP, and consumption  respectively, 
the median  and 60 percent confidence  intervals  of the Monte Carlo 
distribution  of the regression  coefficient  b,  the large  sample  (T=1160) 
median,  the estimates  obtained  from the Standard  and Poors  returns, and  the 
Monte  Carlo  distribution  function evaluated  at these estimated  values. 
Again,  the deviation  of the median  of the small sample  (T=116) distribution —21— 
from  zero is due to small  sample  bias.  This bias increases  as t gets 
larger,  because  the effective  sample  size, as measured  by the number  of 
independent  pieces of  information  (non—overlapping  observations),  decreases 
with t.  For example,  at the 10 year horizon,  there are only 10 non— 
overlapping  observations  available  in the Standard and Poors data,  and 6 
non-overlapping  observations  available  in the CRSP returns!  The median  of 
the large  sample  distribution  (T=1160) on the other  hand,  Is reasonably 
close  to the true value of zero.  The regression  coefficients  calculated 
from the Standard  and Poors data  generally  lie below the median  of the small 
sample  Monte  Carlo distribution.  For the dividend  model,  they are within 
the 60 percent  confidence  interval about  the median  except  for the estimate 
obtained  using  2 year returns.  For  the consumption  and GNP models,  the 
estimates  lie uniformly  within  the 60 percent confidence  Intervals. 
Figures  10—12 display  the details of the Monte  Carlo distributions 
of the regression  coefficients  obtained  from  the equilibrium  returns when y 
is —1.4 in the dividend  model, —1.6 in the GNP model and —1.7 in the 
consumption  model.  Here,  it is the regression  coefficient  for one year 
returns which falls outside  the 60 percent confidence  Interval of the small 
sample median  of the dividend model  but lie uniformly within  this interval 
for the consumption  and GNP models.  The distance  between  the small  sample 
medians  and the actual  estimates  tend to be smaller here than when  agents 
have linear  utility. 
4.3 Mean  Reversion,  S.al1 Sample  Bias,  and Consumption  Smoothing. 
The results  of the previous  two subsections  show that small  sample 
bias  and concavity  of the utility  function  work to generate  returns which 
appear  mean reverting.  Table  2 isolates  the contribution  of each  of these —22— 
effects.  For each of the forcing processes  on which  the model  is 
calibrated,  we report  the deviation  of the small  sample median  from the 
theoretical  value when agents have  linear  utility  (column  1),  and  the 
difference  of the median  generated  under concave utility  from the median 
generated  under  linear utility  (column  2).  When the model  is calibrated  to 
the dividend  process,  consumption  smoothing  seems  to be the dominant  effect 
in the calculation  of the variance  ratio.  In every  other  case, however,  the 
small  sample  bias dominates  at the longer horizon while  consumption 
smoothing  dominates  at the short horizons. 
5. Conclusion. 
Is mean reversion  in stock  prices evidence  of  market  inefficiency? 
We investigate  this question  by asking  whether  the empirically  observed  time 
series  properties  of stock  returns  can be  generated  by an  equilibrium  model 
of asset  pricing.  Monte Carlo  distributions  of variance  ratio statistics 
and long horizon return  regression  coefficients  are generated  using 
equilibrium  returns derived  from the Lucas  (1978) model and a nonstationary 
Markov  process governing  dividends,  consumption, and GNP.  We conclude  that 
the equilibrium  model  cannot be rejected  in the sense  that  the estimates  of 
serial  correlation  in stock returns  using actual  data could  reasonably  have 
been drawn  from our Monte Carlo  distribution.  This  result  is stronger  when 
agents  in the equilibrium model  care  about  smoothing  their  consumption 
paths.  In fact, if the coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  is betveen 1.4 
and 1.7, implying an intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  in consumption 
is between  .58 and  .71, the median  of the simulated  distributions  conforms 
very well to the actual  estimates.  Perhaps surprisingly,  a reasonably  high 
elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  has substantive  effects  on the —23— 
serial  correlation  exhibited  by  simulated  return series.  It does not  take 
much for the desire  to smooth  consumption  to dominate  any wealth  effects 
produced  by changes  in dividends and lead to mean reversion  in asset  prices. 
Furthermore,  our results are robust  to a variety of  assumptions  regarding 
the properties  of the exogenous  forcing variable. 
We make two final points  regarding our results.  The first concerns 
the time series  properties  of the exogenous  forcing variable.  We believe 
that this process,  whether  it be  dividends,  consumption,  or  GNP,  is properly 
modeled  as a nonlinear  stochastic  process.  If we  are correct,  this induces 
the standard  specification  error  into computations  that are based on 
assuming  that  this time series  is some  sort of linear  process.15  While this 
error  could  lead an investigator  to find either  too much  or too little 
serial  correlation,  given  the process which  we  estimate,  it is more likely 
the error  will lead to too little. 
The second  point concerns  small sample  bias  and the implications  of 
this bias for power  in hypothesis  testing.  When  computing  statistics  based 
on returns at five  or ten year horizons,  116 annual  observations  is very 
little  data.  The bias  is also seen to grow  as the effective  sample size gets 
smaller.  The implication  for testing  the null  against  local alternatives  is 
complementary  to Summer's  (1986) point  that most tests of market efficiency 
have  virtually  no power against what he calls  fad alternatives.  Since we 
have shown  that a properly  constructed  equilibrium  model  can generate 
rational  asset  prices which  exhibit a very  wide range of time series 
15. The recent  paper by  West  (1988) is an example. -24— 
properties,  it follows  that, given  the available  data,  the test of any fad 
model  will  have  very little  power against  the rather wide class of 
equilibrium  alternatives.  More  precise estimates  and more  powerful  tests 
can only come  through the passage of time and not by sampling  the data more 
frequently.16  If there had been  a well functioning  asset market  since  the 
time  of the Norman  invasion  (1066 A.D.)  and we  had all the necessary  price 
and dividend  data,  then we  might  begin  to distinguish  among  some of the 
competing  theories. 
16. That  is, in  computing  the autocorrelation  of ten year returns, what is 
needed is more ten year time periods and not weekly or  daily  observations. 
All we can do is wait. —25— 
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Appendix 
In  this appendix  we derive  the equilibrium  price  function  (7). 
Lower  case letters are used  to denote  variables  in  logarithmic  form (i.e., 
• log(X)).  Given  the stochastic  process  for the exogenous  forcing variable 
in  equations  (5)—(6),  the problem is to find the solution  to (4), which  we 
reproduce  here for convenience. 
= D1 k=l 
(a.1) 
We proceed  in two steps. 





+  (a.2) 
= n 
+ a  + a1s 
(a.3) 
From  equations  (a.2),  (a.3), and (6) in the text,  it follows  that 
dt+k 
= d 
+ (nf+k_  n) + jl 
'  k = 1,2,...  (a.4) 




Now take expectations  on both  sides  of (a.5) conditioned  on time 
information.  Exploit  the independence and normality  of the (Ct) sequence  to 
obtain, 
= (DN)' 6k EtN.  (a.6) 
where  . ,exp[(l+y)2u2/2J.  Now sum (a.6)  to obtain, 
kl 
$kEDl:v  (DtN')  5k EN: 
.  (a.7) 
The problem now is to evaluate  t d 
k=l  + 
II.  From  equation  (a.2),  it follows that, 
n+k  = n + k  + Ullt,k_l 
+  k=l,2,...  (a.8) 
k 
where i  e  £ s  is the total number of "ones"  realized  from t+l to t+k,  t,k 
j=l 
and i0  e 0.  (a.8)  can be  manipulated  to obtain, 
d  =  3 (3  exp[(1+y)((k—i)0÷ lt  k—11  (a.9) 
Now sum (aS) and take  expectations  conditioned on time  t information  to 
obtain, 
k=l  EN: 
= N:r B EZ&exPI(l4r)(%i  't,)1  (a.l0) —29— 
To evaluate  (a.1O), we use a result due to Hamilton  (see his equation  3.17), 
which we paraphrase  as follows: 
Result  1.  Let  (sr) 
be a Markov  random variable  which  assumes values 
of 0 or 1  according  to the transition  probabilities  given  by  (6),  and let 
k 
i  E  s  .,  where  j  e 0.  Then  for 0 <  6 < 1, 





1  — f(s) 
8 exp(m) 
1 — 8 
exp(m0)  (p  exp(m.) 
+ q)  + &2exp(20+ ct.1))(p 
+ q — 1) 
(p  + q — 1)  exp()  s 
0 
where f(s) 
p÷q—l  5tl 
Now use Result  1 to  obtain, 




,  (a.l2) 
k=l 
+  1 — (p  + q)  +  (p  + q  — 1) 
where  as  in  the text,  0 •  exp(a(l+y) + (1÷y)2r2/2j  and 
exp(u(l+r)J. 
Notice  that for given  values of  Result  1 
places an upper  bound  on  agent's subjective  discount  factor, .  The  value 
used in all of our simulations  (0.98)  is within  the admissible  region. 
Finally,  substitution  of (a.12)  into (a.7) and (a.l) yields, -30— 
5  exp[(1+y)  sj 11 —  5] 
t  1  -  + q)  +  (p  + q - 1) 
(a.13) 
which  is equation  (7) in the text. —31— 
Table 1. 
Maximum Likelihood  Estimates  and Sum  mary Statistics  of the Forcing  Process 
yt+l 
= yt 
-  + i  St 
+ Ct+l 
Prob [sri  list 
= 1]  = p 
Prob [St1 
= 0s 
= 11  1 — p 
Prob [s1 
= 0i 
= 01 = q 
Prob [sri  list  01  1  — q 
c  i.i.d.  —  N(0,  2) 
Series 
Summary Statistics  for Growth  Rates of the Data: 
Mean  Std. Dcv.  Maximum  Minimum 
Dividends  —0.0038  0.1359  0.4056  —0.4673 
GNP  0.0183  0.0547 





Parameter  Dividends  GNP  Consumption 
p  0.1748  0.5096  0.5279 
(0.832)  (2.034)  (1.985) 
q  0.9508  0.9817  0.9761 
(40.785)  (76.705)  (46.525) 
0.1050  0.0433  0.0320 
(13.682)  (14.932)  (12.297) 
a  0.0131  0.0157  0.0151 
0 
(1.579)  (5.950)  (6.467) 
a1 
—0.3700  —0.1760  —0.0926 
(—6.548)  (—7.116)  (—4.894) A.  Variance Ratios. 
Exogenous  forcing process  calibrated  to 
Dividends  Output 
2  2 
Consumption — 
2 
1  Contri—  1  Contri—  1  Contri— 
Bias  bution  Bias  bution  Bias  bution 
r  y=O  of y=—l.4  y=O  of y=-l.6  yO  of y=—l.7 
1  O.OO0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
2  —0.0118  —0.1180  -0.0195  —0.0460  —0.0134  -0.0434 
3  -0.0301  -0.1639  -0.0580  —0.0773  —0.0382  —0.0753 
4  —0.0456  -0.1806  -0.0935  —0.0906  —0.0605  -0.1013 
5  —0.0594  —0.1925  —0.1211  —0.1039  —0.0877  —0.1110 
6  —0.0717  —0.2062  —0.1416  —0.1195  —0.1027  —0.1237 
7  —0.0866  —0.2018  —0.1478  —0.1371  —0.1298  —0.1216 
8  —0.1012  —0.2068  -0.1769  —0.1229  —0.1469  —0.1248 
9  —0.1162  —0.2097  —0.1916  -0.1248  —0.1597  —0.1325 
10  —0.1242  —0.2091  —0.2022  —0.1362  —0.1760  —0.1287 
B.  Regression  Coefficients. 
Exogenous  forcing  process  calibrated  to 
Consumption  Dividends 
2  2  2 
1  Contri—  1  Contri—  1  Contri— 
Bias  bution  Bias  bution  Bias  bution  t  yO  of y=—l.4  y=O  of y=-l.6  y=O  of y-l.7 
1  —0.0156  —0.1135  —0.0201  -0.0448  -0.0120  -0.0475 
2  —0.0250  —0.0828  —0.0577  —0.0580  -0.0396  —0.0599 
3  —0.0357  —0.0566  -0.0703  —0.0542  —0.0534  —0.0575 
4  -0.0504  —0.0438  —0.0766  -0.0459  -0.0661  -0.0496 
5  —0.0634  —0.0336  -0.0829  -0.0450  -0.0778  -0.0385 
6  —0.0720  —0.0323  —0.0947  -0.0401  —0.0846  -0.0374 
7  —0.0886  —0.0282  -0.1041  -0.0282  -0.0988  -0.0317 
8  —0.1022  —0.0204  —0.1178  —0.0262  —0.1155  —0.0211 
9  —0.1222  —0.0145  —0.1234  —0.0257  —0.1252  —0.0269 
10  —0.1389  —0.0171  —0.1417  -0.0251  -0.1335  -0.0296 
1.  .  .  Median from  Monte  Carlo  distribution  generated  under assumption  that  y=O 
less the theoretical  value. 
2. 
Difference  between median  of Monte  Carlo  distribution  generated  with y<O 
and the median  generated  with y=O. 
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6
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
.
 
T
r
i
a
n
g
l
e
:
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
l
l
6
0
)
.
 
S
t
a
r
:
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
s
 
f
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
s
.
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
8
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
1
0
 .
0
6
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
2
1
.
0
0
1
—
.
0
1
—
 
.
0
3
—
 
.
0
5
—
 
.
0
7
—
 
.
0
9
—
.
1
2
—
.
1
4
—
.
1
5
—
.
1
7
—
.
1
9
—
.
2
1
—
 
.
2
3
—
 
.
2
5
—
 
.
2
7
—
 
.
2
9
—
.
3
1
—
 
.
3
3
—
 
.
3
5
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
0
-
—
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
l
o
n
g
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
g
e
n
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
c
o
n
c
a
v
e
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
=
—
l
.
4
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
Y
E
A
R
S
S
o
l
i
d
:
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
=
1
1
6
)
.
D
o
t
t
e
d
:
6
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
.
 
T
r
i
a
n
g
l
e
!
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
a
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
1
l
6
0
)
.
S
t
a
r
!
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
1
-
-
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
l
o
n
g
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
g
e
n
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
c
o
n
c
a
v
e
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
=
—
l
.
6
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
C
N
P
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
S
o
l
i
d
:
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
1
1
6
)
.
 
D
o
t
t
e
d
:
 
6
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
.
 
T
r
i
a
n
g
l
e
:
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
=
1
1
6
0
)
.
 
S
t
a
r
:
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
l
o
d
e
x
,
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
1
0
 
Y
E
A
R
S
 .
0
7
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
1
0
—
.
0
1
—
 
.
0
3
—
 
.
0
5
—
.
0
7
—
.
0
9
—
.
1
1
—
.
1
3
—
.
1
5
—
.
1
7
—
.
2
1
—
 
.
2
3
—
.
2
5
—
 
.
2
7
—
 
.
2
9
—
.
3
1
—
 
.
3
3
—
 
.
3
5
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
2
-
-
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
l
o
n
g
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
g
e
n
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
c
o
n
c
a
v
e
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
—
l
.
7
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
S
o
l
i
d
:
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
l
l
6
)
.
D
o
t
t
e
d
:
6
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
.
 
T
r
i
a
n
g
l
e
:
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
M
o
n
t
e
 
C
a
r
l
o
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
(
T
l
l
6
0
)
.
S
t
a
r
:
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
i
n
d
e
x
.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
Y
E
A
R
S